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Large and persistent current account deficits are frequently 
raised as a cause for concern for a number of reasons. Perhaps the 
key concern is that countries in this situation could be on a path 
to insolvency, building up excessive net foreign debt, raising the 
prospects of default or a sharp reversal in capital flows, which 
might force an abrupt and costly adjustment.1 Large deficits and 
rising indebtedness could also leave countries more vulnerable to 
adverse external shocks, including a change in sentiment on the 
part of foreign creditors. Some argue that policymakers should take 
steps to ensure that countries move toward a sustainable position 
in which the current account deficit is not so large that it will lead 
to an excessive build-up in foreign indebtedness.
1. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) provide a thorough discussion of solvency 
(when the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied) and sustainability (whereby 
the current account deficit is small enough that net foreign liabilities do not rise as a 
share of GDP). Optimality, by definition, will satisfy solvency, but it will not necessarily 
satisfy sustainability.
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At the other extreme is the argument that as long as markets 
are efficient, current account deficits reflect the optimal decisions of 
borrowers and lenders. Therefore, policy intervention to reduce deficits 
is not only unwarranted, but could reduce welfare. Moreover, policies 
that attempt to rein in deficits may be ineffective, while policies to 
improve market efficiency and enhance welfare could lead to higher 
current account deficits.
Because Australia has a long history of sizeable current account 
deficits, it makes an interesting case study of these issues. This paper 
documents the clear change in the general view in Australia over 
the past three decades concerning the current account balance as a 
policy objective, highlighting issues related to solvency, sustainability, 
optimality, and vulnerability. This period is also interesting because it 
spans the transition from a fixed exchange rate regime with stringent 
capital controls and a heavily regulated financial system, to a flexible 
exchange rate regime with an open capital account and liberalized 
financial markets.
Figure 1 shows Australia’s current account balance and some 
related macroeconomic developments since the 1960s. A shift to larger 
sustained current account deficits is noticeable around the early 
1980s, with the average increasing from 2.6 percent to 4.5 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Most of this rise can be accounted for 
by a drop in the saving rate, rather than a rise in investment. This 
change was sustained in the face of a sizeable turnaround in the fiscal 
position (public sector debt reached a little over 30 percent of GDP 
in the early 1990s and has declined to around zero currently) and a 
large depreciation of the real exchange rate (of around 30 percent 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s). Net foreign debt rose rapidly 
from around 6 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to over 
30 percent by the mid-1980s (which partly reflects the effect of the 
depreciation on foreign-currency-denominated debt); it has since risen 
to about 52 percent. The profile of total net foreign liabilities is not 
quite as steep, with net foreign equity liabilities flat for much of the 
period and lower since the late 1990s.2
2. Gruen (2005) discusses the evolution of the current account deficit in Australia 
and compares the case with selected economies. Data compiled by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006) show that Australia is one of five OECD countries with an annual 
average current account deficit of greater than 4.0 percent (relative to GDP) since the 
late 1980s, along with Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and Portugal. These and other 
OECD countries experienced peak deficits on an annual basis of around 9.0 percent or 
higher, compared with a peak of 6.2 percent for Australia in 2004. These countries also 
have higher net foreign liabilities (relative to GDP) than Australia.Figure 1. The Current Account Balance, Debt, and Other 
Indicatorsa
A. Current account balance
B. Net foreign liabilities
C. Saving and investmentFigure 1. (continued)
D. Public debt
E. Gross domestic product
F. Exchange rate and terms of trade
Source: See appendix B. 
a. Current account averages are shown for 1960 to 1983 and for 1984 to June 2006. The terms of trade and exchange rate are 
indices with a postfloat average of 100 (the latter are on a trade-weighted basis). Annual GDP is in calendar years.495 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
From the early 1970s to December 1983, when Australia had a 
fixed (and later managed) exchange rate regime, current account 
deficits were a cause of policy concern to the extent that they were 
not matched by capital inflows and hence needed to be funded out of 
foreign exchange reserves. The more general and growing concern, 
however, was the problem of managing a partially fixed exchange 
rate while pursuing monetary policy goals with an increasingly open 
capital account. These pressures contributed to the complete opening 
of the capital account and floating of the exchange rate in December 
1983. (Debelle and Plumb, 2006).
The view that policy could and should do something to address 
large current account deficits and the build-up of external liabilities 
persisted after the move to the flexible exchange rate. Indeed, the 
rapid build-up of external liabilities in the mid-1980s heightened 
concerns about excessive and persistent deficits, in part reflecting 
the fact that policymakers could no longer rely on capital controls 
to rein in the current account. The key strategy to address this was 
fiscal consolidation, together with a number of other structural 
policies aimed at improving international competitiveness. While 
such policies had the stated objective of lowering the current 
account deficit, such pronouncements may have also played a useful 
rhetorical role in support of fiscal and market reforms. Of course, the 
usefulness of these warnings would have waned with the realization 
that despite determined attempts, the trend current account deficit 
had recorded no reduction.
Monetary policy, it was hoped, could also play a role through its 
influence as a short-term demand management device. Under the 
checklist approach to monetary policy in place from the mid-1980s, 
the balance of payments was listed explicitly as an important factor 
to guide policy decisions, and there were frequent references to the 
need to rein in sizeable current account deficits.
By the end of the 1980s, several Australian academics were 
arguing that policy should not attempt to influence what they 
perceived to be the outcome of optimal decisions by private agents. 
Within the Reserve Bank of Australia, a debate took place regarding 
the value of having the current account deficit as an explicit objective, 
as evidenced in various published statements. Even so, large current 
account deficits in the late 1980s were seen to be a symptom of 
excess domestic demand pressures, and, at least in that sense, they 
were something to which monetary policy could usefully respond. 496 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
The so-called consenting adults view was gradually taken up by 
policymakers in public statements from the late 1980s onward.3
It is now widely argued that the current account balance need 
not, and cannot, be an objective for macroeconomic policies. Nor is 
it seen by itself as a reliable indicator of vulnerabilities. Australia’s 
experience is particularly relevant in this regard, given its experience 
with large fluctuations in the exchange rate and sizeable foreign debt, 
much of it intermediated through the banking system. The floating 
exchange rate has been an important means of adjusting to external 
shocks, and it provides a mechanism by which Australia’s external 
position is subject to continual reassessment by the markets. The fact 
that Australia has managed to sustain investors’ confidence is evident 
in the maintenance of the current account deficit at an average of 4.5 
percent of GDP over two decades, combined with a real exchange rate 
that shows no discernable trend over the same period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 
provides a brief history of Australia’s current account and incidence of 
capital reversals going back as far as the 1850s. Section 2 steps through 
the various stages of the debate about the role for policy in stemming 
large current account deficits in Australia. Section 3 briefly discusses 
some empirical evidence relevant to the optimality and sustainability 
of the current account in Australia. In Section 4, we discuss the issue of 
external vulnerabilities in the context of a range of structural features 
of the Australian economy. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT ACCOUNT
Australia has recorded sizeable current account deficits in almost 
every decade for at least 150 years (see figure 2). One of the chief 
concerns associated with large and persistent current account deficits 
is that they might increase the prospects of a sharp reversal in capital 
flows, requiring costly adjustments to domestic economic activity.4 
Sharp reversals in capital flows have not been a regular—and certainly 
not a recent—feature of the Australian experience, however, and there 
have been no instances of default on Australian public debt.
3. This view is also known as the Pitchford thesis in Australia, though had an earlier 
origin with Corden (1977). It is termed the Lawson doctrine in the United Kingdom, 
where it can be traced back to Congdon (1982). 
4. For evidence on this issue, see Edwards (2004) and Bordo and Eichengreen 
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Figure 2. Australia’s Capital and Current Account Balancesa
A. Capital account balance
B. Current account balance
Source: ABS; Foster (1996); Vamplew (1987). 
a. Annual data. 
Nevertheless, the economy has undergone two episodes of rapid 
and unsustained rises in net foreign liabilities, the unwinding of 
which were associated with depressions in the 1890s and 1930s.5 
5. The 1871 reversal appears to have reflected a decline in overseas investors’ 
confidence, associated with the collapse of prices of gold mining shares. Confidence was 
restored fairly quickly, however, with these mining companies paying hefty dividends in the 
few years immediately following (Blainey, 1963). During the few years either side of 1910, 
Australians had difficulty raising funds offshore. Foreign investors had lost confidence 
in Australia’s economic prospects, since Australia experienced a drought and a decline in 
its terms of trade at a time when the distress of the 1890s was still a fresh memory. The 
reversal in net capital inflows in 1951 was not due to a withdrawal of capital, but reflected 
a sizeable temporary increase in export earnings associated with a spike in prices received 
for exports of wool (and to a lesser extent metals) at the onset of the Korean War.498 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
These episodes are illustrated quite starkly in figure 3, which shows 
the cumulated current account deficit (as a share of GDP). This 
measure can provide a reasonable approximation to net foreign 
liabilities to the extent that valuation effects are small and real 
GDP growth tends to reduce any past discrepancies over time. This 
appears to be the case in Australia given that after 120 years, the 
cumulative measure matches the first available direct estimate of 
net foreign liabilities very closely.
Figure 3. Cumulative Current Account Deficitsa
Source: ABS; Foster (1996); Vamplew (1987); authors’ calculations. 
a. Annual data. 
Large capital inflows in the 1870s and 1880s pushed up net 
foreign liabilities to very high levels (over 150 percent of GDP). These 
inflows helped to fuel substantial growth in lending by financial 
institutions, much of which found its way into the property market 
(Fisher and Kent, 1999). The collapse of property prices in the 
early 1890s coincided with more than half of the trading banks of 
note issue suspending payments (with around 60 percent of these 
eventually closing their doors permanently) and a large number of 
nonbank financial institutions failing. Deposits in many of these 
trading banks were effectively frozen for years while the government 
enforced reconstruction of these institutions. Most deposits were 
repaid between 1893 and 1901, but in some cases deposits were not 
repaid until as late as 1918. Not surprisingly, overseas investors 
took flight during the 1890s, and their full confidence was not 
restored until the 1910s. The aggregate data imply that large 
capital inflows were restored by the second half of the 1890s, but 499 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
this appears to reflect large direct flows to fund mining ventures and 
related investments associated with the 1890s gold rush in Western 
Australia (Merrett, 1997).
The availability of foreign capital in the 1890s was also affected 
by turmoil in global financial markets. Barings, the large London 
discount house, suffered a liquidity crisis in the 1890s, in part owing 
to its financial exposures in South America. This generated concern 
about all offshore exposures, and it became difficult for Australians to 
raise funds in London at this time. London remained the main source of 
offshore funds even into the 1920s. Australia was virtually cut off from 
long-term borrowings in London from the late 1920s onward, as money 
flowed into the New York stock exchange instead (Royal Commission on 
Monetary and Banking Systems in Australia, 1937, paragraph 114).
Fisher and Kent (1999) argue that for Australia the 1930s 
depression was somewhat different from the depression of the 1890s. 
The banking sector was relatively healthy in the run-up to the 1930s 
depression, having taken a more conservative approach to lending 
in the boom years of the 1920s. Net foreign liabilities (relative to 
GDP) peaked at a much lower level than in the 1890s (according to 
the indirect estimate presented in figure 3). Only three financial 
institutions had cause to stop payments in the 1930s depression, 
and none of these were trading banks. Foreign capital dried up 
after the 1929 stock market crash, but the capital flight seen in the 
1890s episode was not repeated. Even so, concerns about economic 
weakness, combined with a reduction in foreign exchange reserves, 
underpinned a devaluation of the exchange rate in late 1930—despite 
initial resistance by the trading banks, which kept interest rates 
high earlier in the year. Thereafter, the current account returned 
to rough balance, reflecting a combination of factors including the 
decline in activity, the exchange rate devaluation, and an increase 
in trade protection.
A key development of the 1930s episode was the lengths to 
which the Australian government went to avoid default, especially 
on debt held by foreigners (Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns, 2004). 
From April to June 1931, the government of the largest state, New 
South Wales, did not fully meet interest due on foreign debt. The 
Australian government and the Commonwealth Bank made good 
on these payments, however, to protect the ratings of Australian 
governments (with compensating reductions in revenue payments 
made to New South Wales by the Commonwealth). More generally, 
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and cut bank interest rates and interest paid to domestic holders 
of debt to ensure adequate funds for the payment of foreign debts. 
Australia thus maintained an unblemished record with regard to 
foreign holders of debt.
Foreign capital inflows were largely curtailed during World War 
II and were tightly controlled thereafter by a comprehensive system 
of controls introduced as emergency measures during the war.
Debelle and Plumb (2006) document a number of episodes of 
capital flight in the 1970s and early 1980s. These tended to be 
short-lived events based on the speculation of devaluations in 
the context of the fixed and, later, crawling peg exchange rate 
regimes.6 However, the overarching pressure over this period was 
the tendency for sizeable capital inflows (with an increasingly 
open capital account), which made it difficult to achieve the goal of 
internal balance. This tension eventually led to the floating of the 
Australian dollar in December 1983 and a complete liberalization 
of the capital account. 
A significant feature of the years following the floating of the 
exchange rate was a sustained widening in the current account deficit 
and the consequent rapid accumulation of foreign debt, which more 
than doubled between 1984 and 1989. As early as 1984, the Secretary to 
the Treasury, John Stone, expressed concern that a default elsewhere 
in the world would harm Australia as international financial markets 
took flight to quality (Stone, 1984, p 8). Argentina came close to default 
a number of times in 1984, and Stone suggested that lessons could be 
drawn from the 1890s experience, when poor returns from offshore 
investments in South America, particularly Argentina, spilled over 
into foreign investor concern about investing in Australia.7
The rise in the current account deficit from 1985 to 1986 partly 
reflected a fall in the terms of trade and the associated depreciation 
of the exchange rate (of around 50 percent in nominal effective 
6. Heavy outflows occurred in the week leading up to the federal election in March 
1983. After the election, the exchange rate was devalued by 10 percent, contributing to 
the perception that speculators could precipitate significant exchange rate adjustments. 
Speculative inflows also occurred in anticipation of revaluations, particularly toward 
the end of 1983.
7. Other pieces written in the 1980s are less alarmist (Jonson and Stevens, 1983; 
Johnston, 1987), acknowledging both similarities and differences between the 1980s 
and the 1930s. In terms of overseas borrowings, foreign debt as a percent of GDP 
was higher in the 1930s than the 1980s, as was the burden of servicing this debt as a 
share of export receipts. While capital inflow dried up in the 1930s, the 1980s recorded 
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terms over this period).8 Combined with the rise in foreign debt, this 
led the Treasurer at the time, Paul Keating, to warn of the risk of 
Australia becoming a banana republic and underpinned continued 
reform efforts. The banking sector underwent further deregulation, 
a process that had started in the late 1970s. Controls on lending 
to businesses and households were largely removed, and access to 
international capital markets was facilitated. Industrial reforms 
were also implemented in an effort to make Australian industry more 
internationally competitive. A key aspect of this process was the 
Prices and Incomes Accord (an agreement between the government 
and trade unions), which had the dual aims of containing domestic 
inflation and improving international competitiveness (Chapman 
and Gruen, 1990). A further reduction in tariffs on imports and other 
barriers to trade (following an across-the-board cut in tariffs of 25 
percent in 1973) was another important change.
The large depreciation that followed the floating of the exchange 
rate helped improve the competitiveness of domestic firms and insulated 
them from the reduction in trade barriers. However, the depreciation 
did not generate inflation to the extent that might have been expected 
under the old fixed exchange rate regime (in part owing to the impact 
of the Prices and Incomes Accord), and it proved to be stimulatory in 
the face of the declining terms of trade (Debelle and Plumb, 2006).
Australia also provides evidence of the potential for changes in 
the supply of capital to influence the current account. The removal 
of capital controls with the floating of the exchange rate allowed 
foreigners desiring to invest in Australia to bring in capital, and to 
some extent the economy and the current account adjusted to absorb 
this inflow of capital. An episode in the late 1990s also illustrates this 
general point. At the height of the global technology boom, Australia 
was apparently viewed as an “old economy” which contributed to a 
sizeable depreciation of the exchange rate that was not matched 
by a change in the terms of trade (Macfarlane, 2000). The trade 
balance moved from a deficit of about 2.5 percent of GDP in 1999 to 
a surplus of 0.5 percent by 2001, with a commensurate turnaround 
in the current account deficit.9 
8. Because the depreciation raised the Australian-dollar values of debt denominated 
in foreign currency, it generated a widening of the net income deficit, which accounted 
for roughly three-quarters of the widening seen in the current account deficit at this 
time.
9. Dvornak, Kohler, and Menzies (2003) provide estimates regarding the 
relationship between the current account deficit and the exchange rate in Australia.502 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
The question of resiliency in the face of large external shocks and 
exchange rate volatility is taken up again in section 4 of the paper. 
In the next section, we focus on the evolution of the debate about 
the need for monetary and fiscal policies to respond to large current 
account deficits.
2. THE AUSTRALIAN POLICY DEBATE
The policy debate in Australia occurred against a backdrop of 
changing views about the macroeconomic framework, particularly 
in an open economy context. There were three broad aspects to this. 
First, there was a general realization that demand management 
should be directed toward the control of inflation over the medium 
term and that this was the best way to support employment, which 
would be determined in the longer run according to a vertical Phillips 
curve. Second, in a world of internationally mobile capital and flexible 
exchange rates, there was no longer a balance-of-payments problem 
per se, but concerns about vulnerability to external shocks and long-
run solvency remained. Third, Mundell-Fleming models (and later, 
more sophisticated variants) highlighted that monetary policy is well 
suited to controlling inflation in an environment of flexible exchange 
rates (via its affect on aggregate demand), though fiscal policy was 
relevant to questions of international solvency.10
2.1 An Evolving Policy Framework: The Late 1980s
Through the mid-1980s, under the fixed exchange rate, current 
account deficits were a cause of concern for policymakers to the extent 
that large deficits made it difficult to achieve the goals of internal and 
external balance. These deficits needed to be financed out of net capital 
flows and foreign currency reserves, while large swings in net capital 
inflow could hamper policymakers’ efforts to contain growth in domestic 
liquidity. These particular difficulties were largely removed with the 
float of the Australian dollar, not the least because policymakers 
regained control over the setting of domestic interest rates. By the 
10. Discussions of these and related issues include Grenville (1997), Gruen and 
Stevens (2000), Horne (2001), Gruen and Sayegh (2005), and Macfarlane (1999, 2006b). 
In an early case for flexible exchange rates, Friedman (1953) suggests that monetary 
policy should be directed away from external balance and that an exchange rate 
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mid-1980s, large current account deficits were becoming the norm, 
and the Australian-dollar value of foreign debt was growing rapidly. 
At this stage, there was less concern regarding the implications of the 
deficit for the implementation of policy, and the current account deficit 
became an objective of policy in its own right.
At the heart of this concern was the widespread sense that the pace 
of foreign borrowing was unsustainable. Policymakers feared that it 
could ultimately impose a constraint on economic growth, and in the 
meantime, the domestic economy would become more susceptible to 
the vagaries of international investors while debtors would face higher 
borrowing costs. This view gained further credibility when the credit 
rating agencies downgraded Australian Commonwealth debt (Gruen 
and Stevens, 2000). It was at this time, in 1986, that the Australian 
Treasurer, Paul Keating, made his famous banana republic remark. 
The reaction in the markets to this comment was probably greater 
than the reaction to the downgrades themselves.
The current account deficit was clearly not the only problem facing 
the Australian economy. Inflation, which had risen at the time of the 
first oil price shock, persisted at a relatively high rate into the 1980s. 
Improving Australia’s international competitiveness through tariff 
reduction and the dismantling of other protectionist measures was 
also deemed necessary. Notwithstanding efforts to reduce tariffs in the 
1970s, Australia’s legacy of protectionist policies was being blamed in 
part for the emergence of the balance-of-payments problem.
In the 1980s, the fiscal authorities took a lead role in setting 
policies relevant to the current account. In line with the twin deficits 
argument, a key strategy was fiscal consolidation aimed at reducing 
the call on foreign funds by the public sector.11 Restrictive fiscal 
policy was also expected to ultimately allow an easing in domestic 
interest rates. Reforms to improve international competitiveness were 
introduced, including the phased reduction in trade barriers and the 
continuation of the Prices and Incomes Accord to restrain wage growth. 
As already mentioned, the prominence given to the current account 
throughout this period may have partly reflected its usefulness as an 
argument to pursue other worthwhile reforms (Edwards, 1996). The 
value of such a strategy eventually weakened, however, as it became 
increasingly apparent that policy was ineffective at reducing the trend 
in the current account deficit.
11. See Gruen and Sayegh (2005) for a discussion of Australian fiscal policy since 
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As the more flexible tool, monetary policy was to be directed to 
general demand management, such as containing cost and price 
pressures and ensuring stability in financial markets, until other 
policies had time to take effect. It was also hoped that restrictive 
monetary policy would reduce the demand for imports, thereby 
contributing to a rise in the trade balance (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1988, pp. 43, 53). The rest of this section outlines monetary 
policy’s role in the response to the current account deficit.
The role carved out for monetary policy in the second half of the 
1980s was highly ambitious. The belief that monetary policy should be 
guided by a single quantity was called into question toward the end of 
the monetary targeting period of 1976–85, particularly after financial 
deregulation when the already tenuous relationship between monetary 
aggregates and inflation broke down (Johnston, 1985, p. 811). In its 
place, the Reserve Bank of Australia instituted a checklist approach, 
which included “all major economic and financial factors—present 
and prospective” (Johnston, 1985, p. 812). Among other things, the 
balance of payments was listed as an explicit factor and was given 
a high weight in monetary policy settings (see the Reserve Bank of 
Australia’s annual reports in the second half of the 1980s).
With the floating exchange rate, policy needed to be mindful of the 
effects that the exchange rate could have on inflation and Australia’s 
international competitiveness, as well as the potential feedback from 
interest rate settings to exchange rates (Grenville, 1997; Macfarlane, 
1991). These factors, along with more general concerns about stability 
in financial (and exchange rate) markets, variously influenced policy. 
Nonetheless, the Reserve Bank believed it could operate policy as a 
“potent demand management tool” (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1989, 
p 7), with inflation and current account deficits being symptoms of 
excess demand.
Over this period, however, there was a growing sense of 
dissatisfaction by the authorities with what monetary policy could 
achieve. While it was thought that higher interest rates could reduce 
import demand and therefore the current account deficit in the long 
run, the short-term effects were less clear and could even operate in the 
opposite direction if higher interest rates produced an exchange rate 
appreciation. It was always believed that the other arms of government 
policy—namely, fiscal restraint and microeconomic reforms—were 
more effective tools for bringing about a lasting reduction in the deficit, 
and the Reserve Bank came to question whether monetary policy was 
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Toward the end of the 1980s, persistent high inflation increasingly 
became the Reserve Bank’s main focus, though the current account 
deficit still rated a mention in policy discussions.12 This shift in focus 
also reflected evolving views within the Bank about the appropriate 
policy framework. The emerging view was that the single instrument 
of monetary policy could only be effectively directed to a single target, 
namely, inflation (Macfarlane and Stevens, 1989, p. 8; Phillips, 1989). It 
was believed that “monetary policy can best contribute to a sustainable 
external position in the same way that it can best contribute to overall 
growth, namely, by providing an environment of low inflation” (Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 1991, p. 4). By early 1993, the Reserve Bank had 
adopted a flexible inflation-targeting framework and shifted the policy 
time horizon from relatively short-term demand management to a 
medium-term objective of containing inflation (Stevens, 1999).
By the end of the 1980s, it was apparent that no permanent 
reduction in the current account deficit had been achieved despite the 
concerted efforts of policymakers. The current account deficit was back 
to 6 percent, roughly around the level that sparked concern in the first 
place. This was despite an impressive turnaround in the Australian 
government’s annual budget position of around 5 percentage points 
of GDP between 1983/84 and 1988/89 (reflecting both fiscal restraint 
and strong growth) and significant microeconomic reform. The fact 
that these policies had had no (persistent) effect on the current account 
lent weight to the emerging view of academia.
2.2 The Challenge from Academia
In the second half of the 1980s, Australian academics began to 
debate whether the current account deficit was an appropriate target 
of macroeconomic policies and whether the view that the deficit was 
unsustainable was correct. This debate was led by John Pitchford, 
although the so-called Pitchford thesis—or consenting adults view, 
as it is commonly known in Australia—can be traced back to Max 
Corden, (Corden, 1977).13
The Pitchford thesis rests on the understanding that the current 
account balance is the net result of investment and saving decisions 
12. Treasurer Paul Keating reflects this sentiment in his 1988–89 budget speech: 
“while the balance of payments deficit is Australia’s number one economic problem, 
inflation remains Australia’s number one economic disease” (Keating, 1988, p. 4).
13. Makin (1988) also made an early contribution to the debate.506 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
made by agents within the economy (Pitchford, 1989a, 1989b, 1990). 
If these decisions are made optimally, then any resulting current 
account deficit (or surplus) cannot be considered a cause for concern. 
After all, a deficit merely represents households deciding to consume 
now rather than later and firms deciding to take advantage of 
profitable investment opportunities in Australia. These decisions 
are optimal and therefore welfare maximizing. The households and 
firms have made these decisions with every expectation that they 
will have the capacity to repay, and the foreign investors lending 
the money are obviously of the same mind. The deficit, therefore, is 
the result of decisions between consenting adults. At the time these 
arguments were being aired, the Australian government was running 
a budget surplus and the public sector borrowing requirement was 
low, so the current account deficit could largely be considered the 
outcome of private decisions.
The Pitchford thesis fundamentally countered established thinking 
on the current account deficit—that is, the notion that large current 
account deficits are always unsustainable or can ultimately impose a 
constraint on growth. Rather than imposing a constraint on growth, 
a current account deficit represents a means of taking advantage of 
profitable investment opportunities, thereby raising potential growth. 
Capital flows into Australia are presumably the result of foreign 
investors seeking high returns, benefiting both the borrowers and 
lenders in the process.
The key message from Pitchford and others was that 
macroeconomic policies had no role in responding to current account 
deficits and that current policies aimed at reducing the current 
account deficit might be severely misplaced. If the government had 
any role at all in addressing the current account deficit, it would 
be to remove distortions and externalities adversely affecting the 
decisions of private agents. Even then, the first-best solution would 
be to use microeconomic-based policies to remove the identified 
problems at their source.14
The rationale behind existing policy strategies was also challenged. 
The twin deficits argument—on which the fiscal consolidation 
strategy was seemingly based—was convincingly refuted, as it 
assumes that private behavior will not change in response to changes 
14. While the government undertook a lot of microeconomic reforms in the 1980s, 
Pitchford (1989b, p. 2) claims that the relevant microeconomic policies were largely 
not being considered.507 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
in government behavior (see, for example, Argy, 1990). This does 
not imply that fiscal consolidation is inappropriate, but rather that 
it would not necessarily reduce the current account. The argument 
that microeconomic reforms would necessarily lead to a reduction in 
the current account deficit was also disputed. Such reforms might 
make markets operate more efficiently, but does that mean agents 
would invest more or less? Save more or less? This ambiguity led to 
the view that microeconomic reform, while worthwhile for its own 
sake, should not be pursued in order to influence the current account. 
Otherwise, policymakers might not undertake reforms that are likely 
to lead to an increase in the current account deficit but are otherwise 
beneficial (Pitchford, 1989c, p. 11).
2.3 The Response
Not all academics and policymakers sided with Pitchford in his 
thinking, particularly with regard to the hands-off approach. Some 
questioned the new framework and viewed it as untested, instead 
suggesting that policy should be based on the more established 
way of thinking (see, for example, Nguyen, 1990). Most arguments, 
however, did not question the framework, but rather emphasized 
practical considerations (see, for example, Corden, 1991). First, 
private agents are not always able to make optimal decisions. 
Distortions and externalities interfere with incentives and provide 
a rationale for policy intervention. Moore (1989) argued that history 
provided plenty of examples of excessive borrowing by nations that 
had ended in a debt crisis. Second, an agent’s decision that leads to 
an increase in external debt may impose costs on other borrowers 
in the form of higher interest rates stemming from the imposition 
of a risk premium applying to the country as a whole. Third, the 
economy was at risk of an adverse swing in sentiment of foreign 
investors, possibly resulting in a sharp and severe adjustment 
process. In this case, it would be preferable to undertake some 
adjustment preemptively through appropriate restrictive policy 
settings (Argy, 1990).15
While these counter arguments have valid elements, they often 
are not concerned with the current account deficit per se, but see 
it as a symptom of another underlying problem. The appropriate 
15. Argy (1990, p. 79), who at the time was the director of the Economic Planning 
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policy response, then, is to address the underlying problem, be that 
overspending or the distortions and externalities themselves.16
Policymakers started to acknowledge the intellectual weight of 
the Pitchford thesis in the late 1980s. In September 1989 and again 
in June 1990, the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
John Phillips, gave credence to the Pitchford argument, stating that 
the balance of payments was a reflection of the “community’s attitudes 
to savings, consumption, investment and debt” (Phillips, 1989, 1990), 
and the current account deficit was therefore not an appropriate target 
of monetary policy. Instead, the appropriate role for monetary policy 
was controlling inflation, and the Reserve Bank’s stated concern that 
the current account deficit was unsustainable started to wane. A few 
years later, the government also expressed the view that monetary 
policy should not be used to target the current account (see, for 
example, Commonwealth of Australia, 1991, p. 2.33).
The Australian government acknowledged the broader 
implications of the Pitchford thesis in the early 1990s, but it had 
reservations about how well it would apply in practice, in line 
with many of the arguments outlined above (see, in particular, 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1991, p 2.36).17 While strategies such 
as microeconomic reform and fiscal consolidation were important 
in their own right (and for broader goals such as raising national 
saving), they were continually framed as strategies to address the 
current account deficit problem.18
Likewise, the Reserve Bank at this time did not entirely accept 
the view that the current account deficit should not be a concern at 
all. It was deemed to be “a medium-term problem,” at which horizon 
deficits of around 5–6 percent probably were not sustainable (Fraser, 
1994, 1996). Since 1996, the current account deficit has no longer 
featured as part of the monetary policy debate. In 2004, the Deputy 
Governor, Glenn Stevens, restated the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 
view as follows: “whether the current account deficit should be a 
target of any policy is not obvious—it would need to be argued. But 
16. Responses to other arguments can be found in the many papers that constitute 
this debate (see, for example, Corden, 1991; Pitchford, 1989a).
17. The broader community feeling was that the deficit should be regarded as a 
concern, and this led the government to initiate a formal enquiry in October 1991 into 
the causes and consequences of Australia’s current account deficit and overseas debt 
(Langmore, 1991).
18. Many of these issues were also raised in the government-commissioned 
Fitzgerald (1993) report, which outlines a strategy for improving national saving, in 
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whatever one’s view on that question, the current account is not, 
and should not, be an objective of monetary policy” (Stevens, 2004, 
emphasis in the original).
The dissenting voices to the Pitchford view—in both academia 
and policy institutions—have now largely disappeared from within 
Australia. If concerns are raised, they generally herald from 
international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), in their assessments of the external vulnerabilities 
facing Australia.
2.4 External Recommendations
The IMF and the OECD have made regular assessments of 
the Australian economy since at least the early 1980s. Reports 
from the IMF, however, have only been publicly available since 
the mid-1990s. The OECD in the 1980s concurred with Australian 
authorities that the country’s current account deficit and external 
debt position were unsustainable and that such concerns needed to 
be the overriding priority of policy (OECD, 1987). The organization 
recommended reducing public sector debt and improving Australia’s 
international competitiveness (see, for example, OECD, 1984, 
pp. 50–51; also see various issues of OECD Economic Surveys 
for Australia for the 1980s and 1990s). With regard to the latter 
recommendation, the OECD pointed in particular to a need for real 
wage moderation and reduced trade protection. In the areas of fiscal 
policy, the OECD acknowledged that the Australian government 
had made substantial progress in reducing its deficit, but pressed 
for greater efforts by state and local governments.
OECD concern regarding Australia’s current account deficit 
moderated in the 1990s. The OECD describes the current account 
deficit as sustainable in view of current government policies (OECD, 
1994), but the OECD raised concerns throughout the 1990s about the 
potential for high external debt to affect credit ratings and increase 
external risks. The latest OECD report, however, presents a more 
sanguine view (OECD, 2006). The IMF reports from 1995 onward 
describe Australia’s net external debt position as sustainable and the 
external risks as manageable, but recommend that Australia’s external 
debt position requires continued careful monitoring. These IMF reports 
often attribute weight to either the narrowing or widening that had 
been recently observed in the current account deficit, without always 510 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
appreciating that most of these movements are part of a standard 
cyclical pattern around a longer-term average.
Since the Asian crisis, IMF staff have stressed the potential risk 
from a shift in market sentiment, particularly considering that around 
one-half of Australia’s foreign debt has a relatively short maturity. The 
IMF has a standard set of external vulnerability indicators that they 
use for a variety of countries in assessing external risks. Over time, 
the IMF has acknowledged that the one-size-fits-all approach fails to 
recognize some special factors relevant to the Australian situation, 
such as the fact that the external debt is denominated in Australian 
dollars or hedged, that private balance sheets are in a strong position, 
and that the Australian economy has proven to be relatively resilient 
to large adverse domestic and external shocks, including through the 
operation of the flexible exchange rate regime.
3. OPTIMALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT
The intertemporal approach to the current account forms the 
foundation of Pitchford’s view of the current account (Pitchford, 
1989a, 1989b, 1990). Several studies use the methodology developed 
by Campbell (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1987) to test whether 
Australian current account data support the intertemporal model, with 
mixed results. Milbourne and Otto (1992), reject the intertemporal 
model using quarterly data, while Cashin and McDermott (1998) 
and Otto (2003), who use annual data, and McDermott (1999), who 
uses quarterly data, find supportive evidence, but only after 1975, 
1980, and 1991, respectively. Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) extend the 
intertemporal model to account for external shocks by allowing the 
interest rate and exchange rate to vary. They find that this improves 
the fit of the model by better capturing volatility, thereby providing 
support for the intertemporal model.
Following these studies, this section of the paper examines 
optimality through the lens of the intertemporal approach to the 
current account balance, with two innovations. First, in accounting 
for the effect of the capital market opening and financial market 
deregulation, we take advantage of a longer sample of data postdating 
these changes. Prior to these changes, net foreign debt may have been 
less than optimal (because consumption or investment were too low), 
and credit constraints may have prevented optimal consumption 511 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
smoothing in the face of shocks to income. Second, we account for 
the fact that shocks to the Australian net cash flow (that is, output 
minus investment and government expenditure) may be correlated 
with shocks in the rest of the world and thus have a limited effect on 
the current account (Glick and Rogoff, 1995). That is, global shocks 
should lead to changes in the world interest rate, rather than in 
current account balances.
The full details of the model and estimation approach, along with 
detailed results, are reported in appendix A. In summary, we find 
tentative evidence in support of the intertemporal model. The current 
account balance appears to adjust in a way that is consistent with 
consumption smoothing in the face of temporary shocks to output, 
government expenditure, and investment. This is true, however, 
only in the period after financial liberalization in the early 1980s, 
in line with the removal of capital controls and the easing of credit 
constraints. We also find evidence of consumption tilting, whereby 
Australian residents appear more impatient than the world as a 
whole. This has contributed to a persistent current account deficit on 
the order of 4.5 percent of GDP since the mid-1980s. 
It is worth considering what might justify a persistent degree of 
impatience and the resulting long history of current account deficits. 
In the case of Australia, building up the capital stock (both private 
and public) while maintaining a relatively high level of consumption 
would seem a natural outcome for a relatively undeveloped, “new” 
country with considerable natural wealth. This is particularly true 
in the case of an economy that benefits from a relatively steady flow 
of immigrants and institutional features conducive to sustaining a 
relatively prosperous and stable lifestyle.
While the estimates presented in appendix A suggest that the 
extent of this impatience appears relatively modest, it is not possible 
to test the solvency condition—that is, whether the intertemporal 
budget constraint has been satisfied. Indeed, as Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin (1996) note, it is difficult in practice to determine whether 
a country running persistently large current account deficits is 
solvent at any given time. The more feasible test is to examine the 
sustainability of the situation—that is, to determine the level of 
trade surplus, and hence also the current account balance, required 
to stabilize the level of net foreign liabilities (relative to GDP) given 
plausible assumptions about output growth and the costs of servicing 
net foreign liabilities. A number of studies have undertaken this type 
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that an average goods and services trade surplus of around 0.50 to 
0.75 percent of GDP can sustain foreign liabilities at a ratio of 60 
percent, whereas Australia has actually run a deficit on the trade 
account of 1.5 percent of GDP, on average, since 1980. Alternatively, 
if the trend current account balance (of about 4.5 percent of GDP since 
1984) were to be sustained, net foreign liabilities would eventually 
stabilize around 86 percent of GDP (assuming average growth of 
nominal GDP of 5.5 percent per year).
Such calculations, however, do not consider what sort of changes 
would be needed to bring about the turnaround in the trade balance 
and the associated reduction in the current account, or exactly 
when these changes need to occur. Again, this reflects the difference 
between solvency and sustainability: the latter is an assessment of 
what constitutes a stable equilibrium, while the former allows for 
the possibility that even higher, and potentially sustainable, levels 
of foreign indebtedness could be welfare enhancing.
4. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS AND EXTERNAL 
VULNERABILITY
Instead of focusing on questions of sustainability, it may make 
more sense to consider the potential costs of large current account 
deficits and the associated build-up of foreign liabilities in terms of an 
economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. This approach essentially 
falls somewhere in between the position that markets are always 
efficient and all current account deficits are therefore optimal, and 
admonitions that countries with large foreign debts should (gradually) 
reduce their dependence on foreign funds so as to avoid potentially 
costly adjustments in the future.
In the wake of the Mexican and Asian financial crises of the 1990s, 
a number of studies sought to develop models that might provide an 
early warning of external crises, which, by definition, imply a costly 
adjustment (in the form of either a deep recession associated with 
higher borrowing costs or a cessation or reversal of capital flows).19 
By examining time-series data across a wide range of countries, 
this literature attempts to find indicators that can reliably point to 
an increasing likelihood of an external crisis. These studies have 
contributed to a perceived association between large net external 
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debt positions and external risks. Australia is a clear outlier in this 
context, with relatively large net external debt and persistent current 
account deficits, but no crises.
This approach is generally restricted to a limited set of potential 
indicators, and it tends to encourage a one-size-fits-all approach 
to assessing vulnerability, which leads analysts to treat large 
current account deficits and external debt as sufficient statistics 
for vulnerability. However, economists increasingly acknowledge 
the value of recognizing the role of institutional differences among 
countries (see, for example, Daseking, 2002). In this regard, 
Australia has a number of features that tend to make it relatively 
resilient in the face of considerable external shocks. Indeed, these 
features underpin the stability that encourages sizeable capital 
inflows in the first place. This suggests that a high debt level may 
not signal vulnerability, but rather reflects resilience that permits 
high debt to be sustained.
One feature, in particular, helps Australia to be resilient in 
the face of large external shocks, in spite of relatively high foreign 
indebtedness. Namely, foreigners are willing to participate in markets 
that allow Australian residents to hedge their foreign exchange 
exposures at reasonable cost; for instance, foreigners are willing to 
hold Australian debt denominated in Australian dollars. This allows 
the balance sheets and trading activities of domestic corporations and 
households (which are net foreign debtors) to withstand large, sharp 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. Such markets can only evolve 
fully under a flexible exchange rate regime, in which frequent and 
often large fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate are the norm. 
The flexible exchange rate regime also has the advantage of providing 
a timely and automatic mechanism for adjusting to external shocks. 
It can act as a buffer, allowing shocks to dissipate rapidly across the 
domestic economy with a more modest impact on inflation than was 
the case under the fixed exchange rate regime.20
The development of this resilience of the Australian economy 
to external shocks is well documented (Caballero, Cowan, and 
Kearns, 2004; Becker and Fabbro, 2006; Debelle and Plumb, 2006; 
20. The Reserve Bank of Australia believes occasional intervention in foreign 
exchange markets is desirable. The Asian crisis is one such example where intervention 
was used to limit downward pressure on the exchange rate, but only after the exchange 
rate had moved a long way, consistent with the view that depreciation was a desirable 
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Macfarlane, 2006a; McCauley, 2006). These studies emphasize the 
value of maintaining investor confidence in the face of sizeable 
external shocks via the following mechanisms: a robust financial 
system, with deep, liquid, and stable financial markets and strong 
financial institutions; credible and stabilizing macroeconomic 
policies; and low net foreign currency exposure.21 Arguably, an 
element of luck and perseverance in the early stages of floating 
helped these markets and policies to develop. This section of the 
paper summarizes this literature by briefly tracing through these 
key features. The exercise illustrates that while many of these 
features have come about through a conscious effort on the part of 
policymakers seeking to generate resilience, others have arisen as a 
by-product of other pursuits or the result of learning-by-doing.
4.1 The Record on Inflation
A record of, and commitment to, low and stable inflation is 
necessary to keep down the cost of issuing debt. It reassures holders 
of debt denominated in domestic currency that the value of this will 
not be eroded to the benefit of issuers. In Australia, the adoption of 
inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank in 1993 achieved the goal of 
keeping year-ended inflation between 2 and 3 percent, on average, 
over the cycle. Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) argue that, 
notwithstanding higher inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, Australia 
has established a reputation over the past hundred years of being 
willing and able to maintain modest and stable inflation.
4.2 The Government Debt Market
A key factor behind foreigners’ confidence in the market for 
Australian government debt is the fact that foreign holders have 
never suffered from any defaults on the debt, as discussed above. In 
addition, a number of changes in the early 1980s strengthened the 
market for government debt in Australia, apparently contributing 
to the take-up by foreigners of Australian-dollar-denominated 
debt. McCray (2000) highlights the role of financial deregulation in 
reducing the extent to which domestic financial institutions acted 
21. Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) argue that this confidence reflects what 
they term currency trust and country trust. Closely related to currency trust is what 
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as a captive market, thereby contributing to a rise in yields. He also 
points to a range of important operational changes that were made 
as the market moved from a highly regulated environment, with 
tap issuance (whereby authorities set the price) and a buy-and-hold 
mentality, to one of open price discovery (through auctions) and an 
active secondary market.22 
As a result, more than half of Australian government debt—almost 
all of which is issued domestically in Australian dollars—is held 
offshore.23 Foreign investors also hold debt issued by Australian state 
and local governments and corporations. Indeed, more than 70 percent 
of corporate debt is held by offshore investors, with the corporate bond 
market around eight times larger than the Australian government 
bond market. Foreign investors’ interest in Australian corporate 
bonds has been facilitated by a liquid cross-currency interest rate 
swaps market, which has allowed foreign investors to accept currency 
risk while insulating themselves from the credit risk associated with 
lending to Australian firms (McCauley, 2006).
4.3 Financial Markets
Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) emphasize the importance 
of deep, efficient financial markets for helping to ensure that domestic 
residents are able to hedge foreign exposures at a reasonable cost. 
International comparisons suggest that these markets are relatively 
deep in Australia. For example, Australia’s share of world output is 
relatively small at around 1.5 percent (making it the fifteenth largest 
economy), but turnover in the Australian dollar spot and derivatives 
markets (against the U.S. dollar) is the fourth largest in the world 
(BIS, 2005). The average daily turnover of the Australian dollar swaps 
market is A$45 billion (US$34 billion). This market is deep enough 
that the net derivatives position of the banking sector could be turned 
over more than three times a month (Becker and Fabbro, 2006).24
This was not the case during the era of capital controls and 
regulated financial institutions. Debelle and Plumb (2006) discuss 
the early stages of development of these markets as these controls 
22. See also McCauley (2006). 
23. As of June 2006, the Australian government had A$65 billion of bonds on issue, 
of which A$33 billion, or 52 percent, was held by offshore investors.
24. The average daily turnover of Australian dollar swaps between domestic and 
overseas banks is around A$25 billion (US$19 billion), or 2.8 percent of GDP, over the 
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were eased. Australian borrowers learned about the dangers of 
unhedged foreign-currency borrowing early on in the postfloat period 
(see also Becker and Fabbro, 2006). In the mid-1980s, some borrowers 
took out unhedged Swiss franc loans to avoid paying much higher 
domestic interest rates. These borrowers made substantial losses 
when the Australian dollar depreciated by more than 50 percent 
against the Swiss franc between January 1985 and August 1986. 
The scale of the borrowing was relatively small, so the losses did 
not disrupt the economy or the banking system overall. They did, 
however, generate enough publicity to provide a salutary lesson to 
both businesses and households.
The bulk of Australia’s nongovernment foreign debt is currently 
raised by the banking sector. These institutions are not only able to 
raise funds at a relatively low cost (given that they tend to be highly 
rated), but they are also in a good position to hedge exchange rate 
risks arising from these borrowings. It is thus advantageous for 
these financial institutions to act as intermediaries for business and 
household sectors, given that they can provide Australian borrowers 
with relatively low cost and fully hedged access to foreign funds.
As in the United States, Australian residents have a net 
long position in foreign currency (before accounting for hedging 
activities); that is, gross foreign-currency-denominated assets 
exceed gross foreign-currency-denominated liabilities (Becker and 
Fabbro, 2006). Of Australia’s net external debt, around 40 percent 
is denominated in Australian dollars. According to a recent survey 
by the ABS (2005), most of the remaining net exposure is hedged, 
with just over one-tenth of net external debt being in unhedged 
foreign currency (Becker and Fabbro, 2006), which is not to say that 
it may not be covered by some natural hedge. Much of the hedging 
activity appears to have nonresidents as counterparties, thereby 
insulating domestic residents as a whole against unfavorable 
exchange rate fluctuations.
Given that currency risk does not appear to present much of an 
issue for Australia, attention has instead focused on refinancing 
risk, particularly of short-dated debt (see, for example, IMF, 2006). 
Much of Australia’s offshore debt is issued by financial institutions, 
with foreign liabilities accounting for about 27 percent of Australian 
banks’ total liabilities, compared with around 15 percent a decade 
ago. While debt securities make up the majority of banks’ foreign 
liabilities, more than two-thirds of these have been issued with a 
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of around four years; Australian corporations borrowing offshore tend 
to issue longer-dated debt. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
make more than three brief remarks on refinancing risk. First, rolling 
over debt has not been an issue for Australia, even during periods of 
adverse shocks, such as the Asian crisis. Second, Australian banks 
have tended to issue offshore debt in a range of different markets 
and in a range of different currency denominations, providing some 
diversification against shocks that may adversely affect any one 
market (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2006). Third, in the event of an 
adverse shock, much of the adjustment would likely occur through 
a depreciation of the exchange rate.
4.4 Institutional Framework
Stable government with credible and sustainable monetary and 
fiscal policies is necessary for a country to maintain the confidence 
of both foreign and domestic investors. Other critical institutional 
features include a sound financial system based on efficient regulation 
and supervision, effective legal and accounting frameworks, and 
transparent and open markets for both factors of production and 
outputs. In the extreme, these reduce the likelihood of some type 
of expropriation of wealth or income (to the advantage of particular 
domestic residents), either by direct or indirect means. More generally, 
however, they allow countries to better withstand adverse external 
shocks that might otherwise harm foreign investors’ interests.25 
Australia appears to rank highly on a range of indicators in this regard. 
For example, in 2006 Australia ranked ninth (out of 161 countries) 
in the Economic Freedom of the World Index, which attempts to 
systematically compare countries across the types of institutional 
features mentioned above.
One episode that points to the resilience of the Australian economy 
is the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998, when demand from 
many of Australia’s major trading partners in the region declined 
significantly. The nominal exchange rate depreciated in effective terms 
by about 20 percent from mid-1997 to early 2001, but the inflationary 
impact of this was relatively modest. Unlike a number of countries 
25. Kent, Smith, and Holloway (2005) present evidence that structural reforms 
leading to stricter monetary policy regimes, greater labor market flexibility, and 
increased product market competition have played a role in reducing the volatility of 
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with substantial commodity exports to the region, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia did not tighten policy in response to the depreciation. 
Instead, the depreciation was viewed as a necessary part of the 
adjustment to an adverse shock of this type. A widening in the current 
account deficit—of more than 4 percentage points of GDP over the two 
years to mid-1999—was also an important mechanism dampening the 
impact of the shock on the domestic economy. Caballero, Cowan, and 
Kearns (2004) note that the stimulatory impact of the depreciation 
(including by facilitating a diversion of exports to the United States 
and Europe) contrasted with the experience of less-developed 
economies, for which the depreciation adversely affected the balance 
sheets of corporations with sizeable exposures to unhedged foreign-
currency-denominated debts.
5. CONCLUSION
Australia has a long history of large and persistent current 
account deficits. Even so, the deficit rose considerably in the 
mid-1980s following the floating of the Australian dollar and the 
opening of the capital account. It has since been sustained around 
an average of 4.5 percent of GDP, with no discernable trend in the 
real exchange rate. This shift in the 1980s contributed to a rapid 
rise in net foreign debt, and the current account deficit became 
a key object of policymakers in its own right. The chief concern 
was that such deficits raised the prospects of default or a sharp 
reversal in capital flows (or both). In other words, policymakers 
feared that the deficits were not sustainable, implying potentially 
disruptive adjustments in the future, and that they left the country 
more vulnerable to adverse external shocks (including a change in 
sentiment by foreign creditors). Hence, it was argued that all arms 
of policy, in both macroeconomic and microeconomic spheres, should 
and could attempt to reduce the current account deficit.
This view was challenged by those who argued that the current 
account merely reflected the optimal decisions of private agents and 
that for this reason, concerns about sustainability were misplaced, 
and macroeconomic policy certainly had no role to intervene. This did 
not mean that efforts at fiscal and other reforms were unwarranted, 
but that they should not be directed at influencing the current 
account balance, and indeed may not have had the desired effect 
in any case. Policymakers ultimately accepted many elements of 
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deficit remained stable in trend terms despite widespread reforms 
(including a substantial fiscal consolidation leading ultimately to 
no net public debt).
This so-called consenting adults view of current account deficits 
has become widely accepted in Australia among academics and 
policymakers. This paper presented empirical evidence providing 
some support to the idea that, following capital market opening 
in 1983, cycles in the current account deficit in Australia have 
been consistent with optimal consumption-smoothing behavior. 
Sustainability calculations imply that if the recent trend level 
of the current account deficit continues, foreign liabilities will 
eventually stabilize at around 86 percent of GDP, compared with 
around 60 percent in 2006. This says nothing about the more 
important question of solvency, which, under a flexible exchange 
rate regime, is subject to the ongoing assessment provided by open 
and transparent capital markets.
It is generally acknowledged that large deficits and foreign 
indebtedness can imply some degree of vulnerability for a small 
open economy subject to large external shocks, including swings in 
investor sentiment. Australia is an interesting case study in this 
regard, as it has a number of institutional features that ameliorate 
its vulnerability to external shocks. Stable government, credible 
and sustainable monetary and fiscal policies, a sound financial 
system based on efficient regulation and supervision, effective 
legal and accounting frameworks, and transparent and open 
markets for both factors of production and outputs are critical 
features for maintaining the confidence of foreign and domestic 
investors. Of particular note is the fact that foreigners are willing 
to participate in markets that allow Australian residents to hedge 
their foreign exchange exposures at reasonable cost. This allows 
the balance sheets and trading activities of domestic corporations 
and households (which are net foreign debtors) to withstand large 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. Since floating, Australia has 
certainly demonstrated considerable resilience in the face of a 
number of large adverse external shocks.
Indeed, the features that underpin this resilience may have 
encouraged sizeable capital inflows in the first place. In other words, 
Australia’s high debt level may be less a signal of vulnerability 
than a reflection of the resilience that attracts foreign capital and 
keeps it in place.520 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
APPENDIX A
Testing the Intertemporal Model
The model describes a representative agent in a small open 
economy who chooses a path of consumption and investment to 
maximize lifetime utility (equation A1) subject to a budget constraint 
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where Ct is consumption at time t, C is the agent’s discount rate, 
and 1/T is the agent’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution.26 The 
return on an asset is equal to the fixed world interest rate, r. The 
stock of assets held from time t – 1 is Bt, Yt is output, Gt is exogenous 
government spending, and It is investment.27 The budget constraint 
(equation A2) defines the current account balance (or change in net 
foreign liabilities) as being equal to the net cash flow (Zt = Yt – Gt – It) 
less private consumption and foreign interest payments.
The optimal consumption profile is then given by the Euler 
equation:
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26. We use an isoelastic utility function and assume no uncertainty, rather than 
the more commonly used quadratic utility function, which implies a strict upper bound 
on the level of consumption and does not rule out negative consumption levels. In any 
case, the empirical approach is very similar.
27. Labor is supplied inelastically, output is produced according to the production 
function, Y = AF(K), and the optimal capital stock (assuming no depreciation) is such 
that r = AFa(K). Total factor productivity, A, is exogenous.521 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
where Vy 1 – CT(1 + r)T and where wealth, Wt, is defined as the sum 
of current period value of assets and the net present value of current 
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If V = 0, it is optimal for agents to consume the annuity value of wealth, 
leaving consumption constant over time. Otherwise, the consumption 
path will tilt upward if V < 0 and downward if V > 0. 
Finally, the optimal current account is obtained by substituting 
equations (A4) and (A5) into the budget constraint:
CA Z Z
r
W tt t t






where   Zt is the permanent (or annuity) level of the net cash flow. The 
term in parentheses in equation (A6) implies that output below its 
permanent level leads to a current account deficit, and investment 
or government spending above their permanent levels lead to a 
current account deficit. Thus, the net foreign assets adjust to smooth 
consumption in the face of temporary disturbances to the net cash 
flow.28 The second right-hand-side term captures consumption tilting 
that occurs when the rate of time preference, which equals (1 – C)/C, is 
different from the world interest rate (that is, when V x 0). A country 
that is more impatient than the rest of the world will thus be running 
current account deficits in proportion to their level of wealth.
Since consumption is proportional to wealth, equation (A6) 
effectively decomposes the optimal current account into its 
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28. This term also captures the potential for income growth (that is, through 
productivity growth) to influence the level of the current account balance. For a more 
detailed discussion of this possibility, see Engel (2005).522 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
where My –[V(1 + r)/(r + V)2]. Equation (A7) shows that the 
consumption-smoothing component of the current account will be in 
deficit when the net present value of future changes in the net cash 
flow is positive. Furthermore, the consumption-smoothing hypothesis 
embodied in equation (A7) implies that the current account is a 
sufficient predictor of future changes in net cash flows.
A.1 Estimation
The estimation of this model proceeds by decomposing the 
current account into these two components. First, we remove the 
trend behavior of the current account by estimating the extent of 
any consumption tilting (M x 0). Specifically, if CAt
S and Ct are I(1) 
and cointegrated, the residuals will be stationary. In this case, the 
residuals will provide an estimate of the current-account-smoothing 
component (CAt
S), which can be tested for evidence of consumption 
smoothing.
To test the consumption-smoothing hypothesis explicit in equation 
A7, we derive the net present value of future changes in the net cash 
flow by estimating a vector auto regression (VAR), which provides the 






















































A weak test of the consumption-smoothing hypothesis is to determine 
whether the current account Granger causes changes in the net cash 
flow, as implied by equation (A7). The VAR provides a convenient way 
of performing this test.
An estimate of future expected changes in the net cash flow can 


































29. The estimation procedure is justified by asserting that both CAt
S and %Zt are 
subject to measurement error. This model is easily generalized to incorporate higher-
order VARs.523 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
Let ; be the matrix [:ij] and + be a two-by-two identity matrix. The 
optimal consumption-smoothing current account can be estimated by 
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From equation (A11), a stronger test of the intertemporal model is 
the joint test of '%Z = 0 and 'CA = 1.31
A.2 Empirical Results
The data used are annual from 1949 to 2005 (see appendix B for 
sources and details). To be consistent with the theoretical model, 
all series are converted into per capita terms, and nominal series 
(including the current account) are converted into real terms by using 
the GDP deflator.32
The level of the current account has an obvious downward trend 
over the second half of the sample period, which suggests the existence 
of consumption tilting. We checked the series for the presence of a 
unit root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results 
(not reported) confirm that the current account, consumption, and 
net cash flow are all nonstationary variables, but the change in net 
cash flow is stationary.
An estimate of the consumption-tilting coefficient, M, is obtained 
in equation (A7) using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS):
CA C DC C u tt t t i
i
ti t  	
 

 ¤ ME H
1
1
% ,    (A12)
30. Both CAt
S and %Zt need to be stationary in order for equation (A11) to be well 
defined.
31. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) use a stochastic framework but with quadratic 
utility, which implies certainty equivalence and, therefore, yields the same test of the 
intertemporal model.
32. There are two problems with the current account data. First, the current account 
should preferably incorporate changes in net foreign assets stemming from capital 
gains and losses. Second, the net income deficit is based on nominal, rather than real, 
interest flows. This overstates Australia’s real current account deficit, which ran a net 
income deficit over this entire period. This bias will be increasing over time, since net 
foreign debt has been steadily increasing, although it will be offset somewhat by the 
fall in world inflation rates since the mid-1980s.524 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
where Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 1984 
onward and zero otherwise. We expect M to be negative given the 
obvious negative trend in the current account (that is, Australia’s rate 
of time preference appears to be above the world interest rate). The 
inclusion of the second term allows for a break in the trend at 1984, 
consistent with the capital market opening and financial deregulation. 
Before this, consumers probably were not able to borrow as much as 
they desired. In this case, the degree of consumption tilting will have 
increased after 1983; that is, E will be negative.
The current account balance and consumption are clearly 
cointegrated. The ADF for the residuals is –5.61.33 The estimate of M 
is less than zero, at –0.035 (with a t statistic of –4.65).34 Furthermore, 
E is significantly less than zero at –0.029 (with a t statistic of –5.16), 
which confirms that the degree of consumption tilting increased after 
financial liberalization in 1983. This is evidence in support of the 
existence of binding credit constraints in the period prior to 1983 (so 
long as the reasonable assumption of unchanged consumer preferences 
is maintained). 
Figure A1 separates the actual current account into its stationary 
and nonstationary components.35 Using estimates of the sum of M 
and E, we can obtain a rough estimate of the Australian rate of time 
preference, (1 – C)/C. Deaton (1992) provides a summary of estimates 
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/T) that range from 
0.35 to 0.75. Using an interest rate of 4 percent implies that the rate 
of time preference is between 0.04004 and 0.04008.36 That is, the 
consumption-tilting behavior implies rates of time preference only 
marginally above the world interest rate.
33. Critical values for the ADF statistic are from Fuller (1976). The null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. 
34. Reported t statistics have been adjusted as follows, so that the standard 








 ¤ () ˆ ; and IT GG   ˆ /( ˆˆ ) 1 12 , where ˆ T is a consistent estimate of the 
standard deviation of residuals from an AR(2) regression of  ˆ u with AR coefficients 
G1 and G2 . Consistent with theory, no constant term was included in the regression. 
Furthermore, a constant was insignificant when included and had a negligible effect 
on the slope coefficient estimates.
35. The stationary component of the current account is obtained as the estimated 
residuals CA C DC ttt t t    ˆˆ ME N F . The left-hand side of this expression has a nonzero 
mean because of the inclusion of leads and lags of consumption changes in the right-
hand side of equation A12. The nonstationary consumption-tilting component of the 
current account is simply ˆˆ ˆ ME N CD C tt t  .
36. For an interest rate of 2 percent, the estimate is between 0.02001 and 0.02002. 
For an interest rate of 6 percent, the estimate is between 0.06008 and 0.06017.525 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
Figure A1. Current Account Tilting and Smoothing 
Components
Source: ABS; authors’ calculations. 
Before we can estimate the VAR shown in equation (A9), we 
need to control for common world shocks. Theory predicts that 
these will have a much smaller effect on the current account than 
on investment (interest rates adjust to ensure that world savings 
equal world investment). Glick and Rogoff (1995) show that this is 
true for the G7 countries.
The idiosyncratic changes in the Australian net cash flow, 
%Zt




t   BE F , (A13)
where %Zt and %Zt
W are changes in the Australian and world net 
cash flows, respectively. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) show that under 
certain conditions, %Zt can be replaced by %Zt
I in equation A7.37 We 
estimated a VAR(1), VAR(2), and VAR(3); the results are presented in 
table A1. The results of the Granger causality test and the transformed 
coefficient vector, (, are shown in tables A2 and A3, respectively. 
37. These conditions include a zero net foreign asset position. Otherwise, changes 
in the world interest rate will have a differential income effect on net debtors and net 
creditors, thereby leading to some adjustment of these countries’ current accounts. Glick 
and Rogoff (1995) demonstrate that this effect is small for the set of G7 countries. In 
the case of Australia, this effect is likely to be more significant only in the latter part 
of the sample, following the more rapid accumulation of net foreign debt after 1983.526 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
For the VAR(1) and VAR(2), the current account Granger causes the 
change in the net cash flow, but not vice versa, providing weak evidence 
of consumption smoothing. This is not the case for the VAR(3), which 
appears to be a consequence of the loss of the influential observation 
of 1952. However, the estimates of the vector ( imply a failure of the 
strict test of the intertemporal model—that is, the element applying 
to CAt
S should be one, with all other elements being zero.38
Table A1. VAR Estimates: Using Idiosyncratic Component of 














0.08 –0.03 –0.09 –0.22 –0.08 –0.07




0.11 –0.11 0.10 –0.02









–0.35*** –0.03 –0.19 0.18 –0.16 0.39***




–0.20 –0.13 –0.21 –0.25*









1.96 1.46 1.95 1.28 2.01 1.70
No. observations 54 54 53 53 52 52
Source: Author’s estimations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
38. The estimates shown are based on a real interest rate of 4 percent. Results are 
robust to using either a 2 or a 6 percent real interest rate.527 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate












 r 1 7.72*** 2.68* 1.58
%Zi ti
I
 r 1 0.04 1.19 0.34
Source: Author’s estimations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Table A3. Test of the Nonlinear Consumption-Smoothing 
Restriction, 1951–2005a
































Wald statistic 47.65*** 49.84*** 19.60***
Source: Author’s estimations.
*** Rejection of the joint null hypothesis at a 1 percent significance level. 
a. The null hypothesis is 'i = 0 for all i except '1CA = 1.
b. Standard errors adjusted using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity.
This rejection of the intertemporal model could be due to the 
existence of credit constraints prior to 1983. To account for this, we 
reestimated the model for the two periods, 1951–1983 and 1984–2005. 
The Granger causality and transformed VAR(1) estimates are shown 
in tables A4 and A5. In the later sample, the current account Granger 
causes changes in the net cash flow, but not vice versa. Furthermore, 528 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
the stricter test of the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing (that 
is, the restriction on the vector () is rejected for the earlier subsample, 
but not for the later subsample, although the standard errors are large. 
For the VAR(2) and VAR(3), however, which are not presented here, 
consumption smoothing is rejected at the 5 percent significance level 
but not at the 1 percent level for the postfloat sample.















** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A5. Test of the Nonlinear Consumption-Smoothing 













Wald statistic 59.91*** 1.55
Source: Author’s estimations.
*** Rejection of the joint null hypothesis at a 1 percent significance level. 
a. The null hypothesis is '%Z = 0 and 'CA = 1. 529 Current Account Deficits: The Australian Debate
APPENDIX B
Data
—Current account: 1861–1949 data from Vamplew (1987), tables 
ITFC 1–8 and ITFC 84–100; 1950–59 data from Foster (1996), table 
1.1; and data from 1960 onward are from ABS, catalog no. 5302.0.
—Capital account: 1861–1900, indirect estimate of long-term 
capital inflows from Butlin (1962), table 250; 1901–49, apparent 
capital inflows from Vamplew (1987), tables ITFC 101–106 and ITFC 
200–210; 1950–59 data are from Foster (1996), table 1.15; and data 
from 1960 onward are from ABS, catalog no. 5302.0.
GDP: 1861–1900 is in market prices from Butlin (1962), table 1, 
column 2; from 1900–01 to 1949–50, data are from Vamplew (1987), 
table ANA 119–129; for 1950–59, data are from Foster (1996), table 
5.1a; and for 1960 onward nominal and real GDP are from ABS, 
catalog no. 5206.0.
—Net foreign liabilities: ABS, catalog no. 5302.0.
—Saving, investment, terms of trade, consumption, government, 
and investment expenditures: ABS, catalog no. 5206.0, tables 2, 9, and 
32. A statistical discrepancy, averaging 2.3 percent and –0.2 percent 
of GDP from 1960–75 and 1976–2006, respectively, reconciles the 
saving-investment balance to the current account.
—Public sector debt: Australian government debt is from Treasury 
Budget Paper 1, table A3; 1960–82 total general government and 
public sector debt are from Vamplew (1987), table GF1–33; and from 
1988 onward they are from Treasury Budget Paper 1, table A4. Some 
data were not available for 1983–87.
—Trade-weighted indices (of the exchange rate): Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin, table F.11. CPI data for Australia’s trade partners, 
from Datastream, are used to calculate real trade-weighted indices.
—Population: ABS, catalog no. 3105.0.
—World net cash flow: based on net cash flow (NCF) for Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Data are from the IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. Percentage changes in net cash flow for each country are 
weighted by nominal GDP. Countries with missing data were not 
included in that year’s net cash flow.530 Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell, and Christopher Kent
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